

25X1A

Approved For Release 2001/03/17 : CIA-RDP82-00457R00045003

# INFORMATION REPORT

CD NO.

**CONFIDENTIAL**

DATE DISTR. 4 APR 50

COUNTRY Poland

SUBJECT The Polish Communist Party  
25X1C

NO. OF PAGES 5

PLACE  
ACQUIRED

NO. OF ENCLS.  
(LISTED BELOW)

25X1A

DATE OF INFO.

SUPPLEMENT TO  
REPORT NO.

25X1X

1. The Polish United Workers' Party (Polska Zjednoczona Partia Robotnicza - PZPR), or the Polish Communist Party, is so organized that the actual members of the party have little or no opportunity to influence the line of action or policy to be taken. All tactics and decisions are handed down from the top and automatically agreed to. In the case of the Polish Communist Party, the Central Committee holds only a small amount of the authority generally delegated to this body.
2. In addition to the Central Committee other principal subdivisions of the Party in Poland are as follows:
  - a. The Politbureau, which is composed of the following members: Boleslaw Bierut, Jakub Berman, Jozef Cyrankiewicz, Franciszek Jozwiak, Hilary Minc, Stanislaw Radkiewicz, Adam Rapacki, Marian Spychalski, Henryk Swiatkowski, Roman Zambrowski, and Aleksander Zawadzki.
  - b. The Secretaries of the Central Committee are: Jozef Cyrankiewicz, Roman Zambrowski, and Aleksander Zawadzki.
  - c. The Bureau of Organization, composed of the following: Boleslaw Bierut, Jerzy Albrecht, Antoni Alster, Stefan Arski, Feliks Baranowski, Jakub Berman, Hilary Chelkowski, Tadeusz Cwik, Jozef Cyrankiewicz, Wladyslaw Dworakowski, Henryk Jablonski, Leon Kasman, Julian Kole, Franciszek Mazur, Hilary Minc, Zenon Nowak, Edward Ochab, Wlodzimierz Reczek, Marian Rybicki, Henryk Swiatkowski, Roman Zambrowski, Janusz Zarzycki, Aleksander Zawadzki, and Stanislaw Zawadzki.
  - d. There exists also a Central Committee of Party Control, but its membership list is not available to informant at this time.
3. The Party subdivisions named above represent the official hierarchy. It is a common mistake to attach too much importance to these various Party organs; it

### CLASSIFICATION

~~SECRET~~

[illegible]

This document is hereby regraded to **CONFIDENTIAL** in accordance with the letter of 16 October 1978 from the Director of Central Intelligence to the Archivist of the United States.

**Next Review Date: 2008**

Document No. \_\_\_\_\_  
No Change in Class. ☐  
☒ Declassified  
Class. Changed To: TS S C  
Auth.: HQ 102  
Date: 01/06/78 By: 029

Approved For Release 2001/03/17 : CIA-RDP82-00457R004500330001-9

SECRET

25X1A

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

-2-

should at all times be remembered that the importance of any subdivision or individual in the case of Poland is wholly dependent upon the attitude and support from Moscow. It may also be pointed out that what may be a responsible important position within the organization of the Russian Communist Party may not be of any significance at all in the Polish Communist Party, in spite of the fact that it is an identical organ or position.

4. Behind the official facade of the Polish Communist Party there is much discord, animosity, jealousy, and struggle for imaginary power and position among the members of the Politbureau and other lesser officials of the hierarchy. It is also a great mistake to presume that any one of the Politbureau members enjoys the boundless confidence of Stalin or even has a direct channel of communication to him. The individuals of the Politbureau of the Polish Communist Party are being used by the Kremlin in the way which best suits the purposes of the Soviet Union.  
25X1X
5. [REDACTED] only fragmentary information is available concerning the apparatus that is organized for the purpose of governing the satellite countries. One of the more plausible and frequently reported arrangements is the existence of National Departments for each of the satellite countries within the Foreign Section of the Russian Communist Party, and that it is from these departments that the satellite governments receive their immediate direction. In the case of Poland it is reliably stated that such a Polish department does exist.
6. This being the case, the authority of the Politbureau of the Polish Communist Party is third in line; first, the Politbureau of the Russian Communist Party on matters concerning top policy; second, the Polish Department of the Foreign Section of the Russian Communist Party, and finally, the Politbureau of the Polish Communist Party. From the nature of the above arrangement it is quite clear that the members of the Polish Politbureau are not informed of all pending actions nor are their desires and suggestions honored in the formulation of plans or decisions. The organs of the Polish Communist Party should not in any way be considered capable of formulating an independent program or policy. They are actually only organs for the execution of the orders received from Moscow.
7. Of the personalities concerned, Berman is the individual enjoying the greatest confidence of the Soviet leaders, and he is considered one of the most important figures in Poland's government today. Another individual known for his obedience to the Soviet Union is Bierut. In many circles he is known as "Moscow's megaphone" in Poland. Other individual Communists who have been educated in the Soviet Union are Zambrowski and Zawadzki. 25X1X
8. [REDACTED] Zambrowski is the individual who has been selected to carry out the long range program for the sovietization of the Polish state. The former Socialists who were taken into the Politbureau for appearances only and who are now without importance are Cyrankiewicz and Papacki.
9. The group of native Polish Communists includes Jozwiak, Minc, Radkiewicz, Sychalski, and Swiatkowski. The status of these individuals is unclear, but it is believed, with perhaps the exception of Radkiewicz, that they are not considered worthy of responsibility for the future Communist-Soviet cooperation in Poland.  
25X1A
10. Minc's position was considerably weakened the spring of 1949. [REDACTED]  
25X1A [REDACTED] it is learned that his weakened position was due to the following reasons:
  - a. Personal intrigues developed against him by a number of his colleagues.
  - b. His moderation concerning the economic matters in Poland; specifically, the protection and retention of specialists in their positions, and his aversion and opposition to rapid socialization of the industry and total rapid collectivization of Polish agriculture.
  - c. The fact that he is of Jewish origin.

~~SECRET~~

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

25X1A

-3-

Subsequent developments, believed to be a result of his visit to Moscow in May 1949 have shown that Minc has survived that phase of economic disgrace and retained his position. This does not indicate that Minc is in personal favor with anyone in the Kremlin, but rather that there has been a change in the plans and that these plans happen to correspond to the theory and plan outlined by Minc, meaning in effect a slowing down of the socialization and collectivization programs in Poland.

11. The election of Cyrankiewicz as one of the secretaries of the Central Committee does not mean that he is considered of any importance. In reality, the General Secretary of the Party is Bierut, but for reasons unknown this fact is not officially reported; officially the others are listed and conduct the duties of the secretary's office, but they are presided over by Bierut.
12. The problem of Gomulka is considered worthy of special attention. As background information it is necessary to recall that at the Party congress of August 1948, Gomulka was known as a promoter of Marshal Tito. During the following three days he refused to deny his statements, but subsequently, because of heavy pressure, he was forced to do so under the threat of severe penalties. At a Party congress in December he spoke against the Soviet conception of absolute rule by the Russian Communist Party. Gomulka's views are interpreted to mean that each Party, in relation to all other Communist Parties, should be independent and have the right to decide its own program of action and the best methods of activation of any program in its own country. This opinion was severely condemned by Bierut, but for a long time strangely supported by Kliszko and Loga-Sowinski. As the attitude of the Kremlin became evident, these individuals soon joined in the condemnation of Gomulka. Gomulka refused to withdraw his statements but agreed that in the future he would adhere to the decision of the majority of the Party Congress. In spite of this episode, peculiarly enough, Gomulka was elected to the Central Committee. Later, however, he was dismissed from this position and demoted to a secondary position in the General Control Office. Before the trial of Rajk, Gomulka was allowed to make a statement to the press disclaiming any sympathy or admiration for Tito. Recently he was pointed out by the press as one of the personalities who had returned medals previously received from the Yugoslavian Government. There is no indication that he has been arrested, although it is reliably known that Spychalski has been arrested. It is obvious that there have been strong tendencies to protect Gomulka, [REDACTED] he was dismissed on a direct order from Rokossovski. In the Polish Politbureau the case of Gomulka was under consideration for a long time, with no decision being reached. The continuing systematic purge of individuals has continued, but in each instance the direct implication of Gomulka has been avoided.
13. The native Communists of the satellite countries, except those educated in the Soviet Union, generally consider the development in their own country superior to that of the Soviet Union. There is, therefore, a prevalent feeling also that the Soviet Union should respect the decisions and opinions of the local Communist Government. The local leaders consider themselves more competent to administer the affairs of their country than the imported leaders designated by the Soviet Union.
14. Gomulka is considered one of the most intelligent of the Polish Communists, and it is well known that he considers installation of collectivization on the Soviet pattern as economic and political nonsense. Gomulka does not entirely oppose the collectivization plan but claims that this plan must be implemented in accordance with the planning and decisions of the local Politbureau. In all cases he has opposed rapid collectivization which, in his opinion will lead to unnecessary ruthlessness, to which the peasants would be most averse and will destroy the Polish agricultural economy.
15. In the summer of 1948 orders were issued by Moscow to enforce the collectivization program throughout the satellite countries. This caused friction within the inner circle of Polish Communists. At this time Gomulka defied the authority of

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

25X1A

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

-6-

Moscow to dictate such conditions or orders to Poland. There also arose the question of Tito, and Gomulka was opposed to any condemnation of him in the name of the Polish Party. At this time it was understood that a great many of the party members shared Gomulka's views but were afraid to express their opinions. Gomulka was severely attacked by Bierut, who at all times is opposed to the questioning of any directives received from Moscow. During the congress of August 1948, Gomulka refused to retract his statements for three days, but was finally forced into submission.

16. One of the fundamental differences between the Polish Communist Party and the Russian Communist Party is the feeling of Russian superiority which, through its leaders, the Russian CP wishes to exert over Poland and other satellite Communist parties. It is the contention of Gomulka and an unidentified number of Polish Communist Central Committee members that there should be equality between all Communist Parties; that it is contrary to the Communist principle that the Russian CP should dictate the program, terms, planning, etc. of the other parties. In this struggle Gomulka is quoted as saying that he will bow to the will of the majority of the Central Committee of the Polish CP, but not to dictates handed down by the Russian Communist Party, as this is contrary to the national integrity and welfare of Poland.
17. Gomulka's election to the Central Committee is an indication that his views are supported by many. Later, however, he was forced to leave this position; he was not arrested but instead removed to a position in the General Control office. Gomulka's resistance has borne some fruit, as the rapid collectivization originally intended for Poland has been slowed down and the entire collectivization plan is now in danger of losing ground. At the present time this program is at a standstill.
18. It is considered a moot question whether or not Gomulka will be allowed to return to the fold. There are indications that this is not an impossibility as Gomulka was not touched during the Rajk trial; he was allowed to publish a letter in which he disclaimed his previous statements in favor of Tito and, as previously mentioned, he was named as one of the persons who returned a medal previously received from the Yugoslav Government; all attacks against him have been very diffuse and weak. On the other hand, it is difficult to envision Moscow's plans for him in view of his strong nationalistic views and his open refusal to be subordinated to the Russian Communist Party. The most logical explanation is that the Russians realize the strength of Gomulka's silent followers and therefore dare not risk making him a martyr and thus further consolidate nationalist opposition.
19. Another question of concern at the present time is the position of the economist Minc. He is considered a practical economist who does not wish to have his program subordinated to political maneuvers. As an economist, Minc would not object to Poland's participation in the Marshall Plan but naturally understood that this would not be allowed by the Soviet Union. As remuneration for Poland's abstinence from the Marshall Plan, Stalin is quoted as having promised to deliver to Poland, on a credit basis, the Gigant steel works, with a production capacity of one and a half million tons a year, several complete chemical works, etc. However, when it came time to effect this transfer after considerable procrastination, numerous Russian specialists and strategists came forward with the objection that it would be unwise for the Soviet Union to deliver such valuable industries to such a vulnerable forward point as Poland. To date no further attention has been given this proposal, nor is any expected.
20. Minc is a firm believer that cautious action must be instituted in order to preserve the remaining Polish agriculture. He is not basically opposed to the idea of collectivization but is of the opinion that it must be a gradual process geared to the economic and productive revival of the occupation. He contends that rapid collectivization at this time will ruin Polish agriculture and that at all costs this must be prevented. He is likewise opposed to the rapid socialization of all Polish industry and retail trade, fearing ruination will result if the program is not conducted at a reasonable pace.

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

25X1A

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

-5-

CONFIDENTIAL

21. The position of Mine is considered precarious, as it would only require a direct order from Moscow to demand the enforcement of rapid collectivization and socialization, and thus force Mine from his position, place him on the side of the opposition to the Soviet Union, and cause the end of his career. Another factor which may influence his early retirement is his ill health. It is entirely possible that the Russians are counting on this natural cause to remove him from their path.
22. In conclusion it is fully realized that developments may progress in an entirely different pattern as a result of the appointment of Marshal Rokosovski.

~~SECRET~~